Enforcement Action

President Trump’s pick for Attorney General, Pam Bondi, took quick action upon her swearing in on February 5, 2025, to make changes within the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) via the issuance of fourteen separate memorandum directives to DOJ employees. The memoranda kick-off Bondi’s efforts to re-calibrate DOJ policies, enforcement priorities, and internal procedures to align with broader policies of the Trump administration. Two of the memoranda in particular, one laying out a “General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing” (“General Policy Memorandum”) and the other focused on the “Total Elimination of Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations” (“Cartel Policy Memorandum”), include several key changes related to the DOJ’s enforcement of corporate crime, corruption, and national security-related laws.

On February 10, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order on “Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security” (“the E.O.”). The E.O. orders Attorney General, Pam Bondi, to cease initiation of new enforcement actions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), review all existing investigations and enforcement actions, and issue new guidelines and policies as necessary.

On November 17, 2024, the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), in its role as chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”), published a final rule (“Final Rule”) increasing maximum penalties for violations and expanding the Committee’s ability to compel parties to respond to information requests, among other revisions. The final rule becomes effective on December 26, 2024, and is very similar to the proposed rule, dated April 15, 2024, of which we wrote about in our article, Less Bark and More Bite? CFIUS Proposed Rule Enhancing Enforcement Capabilities. 

The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) just issued a significant rule change that reshapes the landscape of export control enforcement.

The Department of Justice really wants violators of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to come forward: following a January 2023 revision of its Corporate Enforcement Policy that incentivized voluntary self-disclosure, the agency launched a DOJ whistleblower reward pilot program on March 24, 2024. 

Just in time for Spooky Season, the Biden Administration announced executive actions related to the much used – and much lamented, depending on who you ask – de minimis exemption, which allows shipments valued at $800 or less to enter the United States duty-free and with reduced information requirements. Among other changes, the executive actions propose to remove de minimis treatment for merchandise subject to Section 301 Chinese-origin goods.

On August 14, 2024, the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) announced in a press release a revamped Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”) enforcement webpage. Among other updates, the webpage provides information about six CFIUS penalty actions from 2023 and 2024. For the past several years, CFIUS’s webpage only included two enforcement actions, one from 2018 and another in 2019. The lack of enforcement action likely gave the casual observer the impression that the Committee was not actively enforcing the CFIUS regulations. Now, the Treasury press release touts, “In 2023 and to date in 2024, CFIUS has issued three times more penalties than it had in the previous nearly 50-years since its establishment.” 

The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, usually referred to as “DDTC,” is somewhat notorious for- as the saying goes- holding their cards close to the vest when it comes to offering guidance on specific topics related to the ITAR and how it applies to exporting goods and services to foreign persons or countries. So, for any U.S. exporter whose products or services are captured under the ITAR, it is important to take notice when DDTC speaks by publishing guidance.  

On March 25, 2024, DDTC published a short series of Frequently Asked Questions regarding joint ventures[1] and how those contractual arrangements affect an exporter’s DDTC registration. Following are a few of the key points from the FAQs.

The U.S. agencies most well-known for their enforcement of U.S. trade and national security laws are the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”). However, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) can often play a critical role in these types of matters. 

A new proposed rule issued by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) seeks to expand the scope of information that CFIUS can request from parties, expand its ability to monitor and investigate non-notified transactions, target procedural weaknesses in mitigation negotiations, and increase penalties. Written comments on the proposed rule must be received by May 15, 2024. 

On February 28, 2024, the U.S. Department of State and The Boeing Company (Boeing) agreed to an administrative settlement regarding 199 violations by Boeing of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). As a result of that settlement, Boeing was fined $51 million ($27 million to be paid over the next 3 years, plus $24 million suspended but required to be applied internally to consent agreement conditions). Boeing will also be subject to a plethora of other conditions over the next three years, including government monitoring via a Special Compliance Officer, which will oversee Boeing’s adherence to the conditions of the settlement. 

In a move that highlights the U.S. government’s ongoing fight against evasion of sanctions and export control laws, the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Justice yesterday published yet another Tri-Seal Compliance Note directed specifically at foreign persons, describing the applicability of these international trade and finance laws to foreign-based persons (the “March 6 Compliance Note”). Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the significant increase of sanctions and export controls targeting Russia, these Departments have published Tri-Seal Compliance Notes on “Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions” and “Export Controls and Voluntary Self-Disclosure of Potential Violations.”

Global maritime shipping is the keystone of international commerce. So when international shipping is in crisis, global trade and supply chains are likewise brought into crisis. The shipping sector has faced many challenges to ocean transit over the last several years. As we can see from the current global news headlines, the shipping sector is facing yet another significant challenge from the Houthi rebel attacks on ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, a necessary route for vessels transiting the Suez Canal. 

On December 28, 2023, a federal court sentenced New Hampshire charity NuDay (a/k/a NuDay Syria) to five years of probation – the maximum sentence for an organizational defendant – for three counts of Failure to File Export Information.

Regular readers of our newsletter, and those familiar with U.S. import and export regulations, know that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) generally enforces the U.S. import regulations, while multiple executive government agencies administer regulations related to the export of goods.

In July 2019, CBP updated its Mitigation Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), specifically the section related to forfeiture remission for export seizures. [1]

In 2022, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) processed $3.35 trillion in imports, issued 2,121 penalties, and collected $19.3 million from penalties and liquidated damages. [1] Section 1592 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is the primary customs penalty provision and is the enforcement tool used by CBP to ensure compliance with Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) classification, valuation, and other entry requirements. 

The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) published its third consent agreement of the year on August 28, 2023. This consent agreement is part of an administrative settlement with Island Pyrochemical Industries Corporation (“IPI”)1 involving three alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). Specifically, IPI engaged in unauthorized brokering activities related to the transfer of ammonium perchlorate (“APC”)2 from an entity from China, a proscribed country under §126.1 of the ITAR, to a Brazilian company. In addition, IPI misrepresented the roles of the Chinese and Brazilian entities and falsely stated that it was the manufacturer of APC on DSP-5 license applications.  

In the United States export control laws and regulations require companies to receive export licenses prior to releasing any controlled items or technologies to non-U.S. persons. The process of determining what is controlled under the export regulations is a complex, technical process requiring the assistance of technical experts (such as engineers) and experts in the export regulations. The restrictions on releases of controlled technologies are known as “deemed exports” to non-U.S. persons such as, foreign national employees working in the U.S. under valid work visas. The practical difficulties arising from performing export classification reviews and determining who is a U.S. person or a non-U.S. person as defined in the export regulations often leads to inadvertent discriminatory practices that run afoul of anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. This is because oftentimes companies may believe it is easier to avoid having non-U.S. persons on staff altogether rather than risking export regulation violations. 

On April 20, 2023, VTA Telecom Corporation (“VTA”) entered into an administrative consent agreement with the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) to resolve six alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) for unauthorized exports of defense articles and technical data to Vietnam.

In recent years, Singapore has become a significant hub for international commerce. According to the U.S. International Trade Administration, the U.S. was Singapore’s fourth largest source of imports in 2021 and the primary choice for technology firm regional headquarters.  In addition, Singapore’s economy relies heavily on “transshipment and its status as a business hub.”  As such, Singapore serves as a focal point for international trade, and as two recent U.S. government actions suggest, a possible new focus for trade-related enforcement.

As TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew was facing (often contentious) questions from members of Congress during a four and a half hour hearing on March 23, 2023, many casual observers were learning for the first time about the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”). 

On April 6, 2023, the Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) announced a settlement with Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) and issued a combined $3.3 million in civil penalties to settle potential violations of sanctions and export control laws pertaining to Russia and other sanctioned jurisdictions. 

In a memorandum published by the Bureau of Industry and Security on April 18, 2023, the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) announced that it wants to incentivize voluntary self-disclosures (VSDs) after a party uncovers “significant” possible violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the types of violations that reflect national security harm.

In its announcement today, OEE spelled out the types of benefits that industry or academia gets when deciding to file a VSD, which often include a substantial reduction in potential monetary liability. Today’s announcement comes after OEE’s announcement last year, shifting administrative enforcement policies that impacted the VSD process.

On January 17, 2023, Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Criminal Division Kenneth Polite announced the “first significant changes” to the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement Policy (CEP) since 2017. AAG Polite’s remarks come roughly four months after Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa Monaco’s speech, calling for all DOJ components to reexamine their voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) policies and “to clarify the benefits of promptly coming forward to self-report, so that chief compliance officers, general counsels, and others can make the case in the boardroom that voluntary self-disclosure is a good business decision.” According to AAG Polite, the Criminal Division “took the DAG’s call as an opportunity to reassess and strengthen” its existing policies. The revised CEP, which “applies to all corporate criminal matters” handled by the Criminal Division, offers companies “new, significant, and concrete incentives to self-disclose misconduct,” and even where companies do not self-disclose, incentivizes “companies to go far above and beyond the bare minimum when they cooperate” with DOJ investigations.

We have seen a tremendous year in the trade and national security front and are now, more than ever, deeply aware of the impact trade compliance professionals have on safeguarding national security in the face of continued geopolitical threats. Here are some of the 2022 year-end review highlights.

On October 20, 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, acting as Chair of the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee”), released the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines (“the Guidelines”). The Committee, sometimes called a “black box” for its notoriously opaque internal processes, is authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign investment in the United States and certain real estate transactions by foreign persons to determine the effect of such transactions on U.S. national security. CFIUS is tasked with identifying and mitigating certain national security risks, often by entering into agreements or imposing conditions on transaction parties. The Guidelines provide insight into how CFIUS determines whether and in what amount to impose a penalty or take some other enforcement action against a party that fails to comply with CFIUS mitigation agreements or other legal obligations.

On Tuesday, August 2, 2022, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS” or “the Committee) released its Annual Report to Congress for calendar year 2021. The report, replete with charts, tables, and graphs visualizing the data and comparing it to prior years, broadly details the work the Committee has done in the past year concerning oversight of foreign investment transactions in areas deemed critical to U.S. national security. There are several key takeaways from the report that are particularly important to international businesses looking to invest in the United States.

On July 13, 2022, the U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), as part of a pilot program, issued two Open General Licenses (“OGL”), which were subsequently published via Federal Register on July 20, authorizing the retransfer and reexport of defense articles subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) within or between Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Like General Licenses issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under the U.S. Treasury Department, OGL No.1 and OGL No. 2 apply if the transaction meets the stated requirements, without specific application to DDTC.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (“FARA” or “the Act”) is a controversial disclosure law that aims to combat covert foreign influence in the United States by promoting transparency with respect to the political, media, and public relations activities of so-called “agents of foreign principals.”

On January 21, 2022, the U.S. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) entered into a consent agreement with Torrey Pines Logic, Inc. (“TPL”) and its founder and president, Dr. Leonid Volfson, for alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). TPL, an electro-optics and communications equipment company, allegedly committed violations that involved the attempted unauthorized export and unauthorized export of defense articles, including to proscribed destinations; involvement in ITAR-regulated activities while ineligible; and failure to maintain export transaction records.

As the U.S. and the European Union continue to impose new sanctions on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine, regulatory authorities continue their pursuit of companies and individuals who violate those sanctions. The most recent example is a settlement agreement between the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) and S&P Global, Inc. (“S&P”).

The largest criminal monitorship in U.S. history has ended. On March 22, 2022 a U.S. judge ruled that Chinese telecommunications giant ZTE Corporation had completed the terms of its five-year probation, which began in 2017 following ZTE’s criminal plea agreement for its role in exporting controlled U.S. products to embargoed countries.

The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") is making it harder on companies that commit corporate crimes. A lot harder.

That’s the message that Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco recently gave attendees at the American Bar Association's White Collar Crime Conference in Miami. In her speech, DAG Monaco laid out the major changes to how the DOJ will approach corporate crimes and the individuals who commit them.

On October 28, 2021, Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco addressed the ABA’s National Institute on White Collar Crime, in which she made clear that monitorships are back on the menu as a means of ensuring corporate compliance. DAG Monaco stated that, “to the extent that prior Justice Department guidance suggested that monitorships are disfavored or are the exception,” she is rescinding that guidance, emphasizing “that the department is free to require the imposition of independent monitors whenever appropriate.”¹

Knowledge of the monitorship process – what may lead to it and what it can mean for your organization – is crucial for general counsels and employees alike. This article intends to demystify these court appointments, providing an overview of Department of Justice² Monitorships, when they are imposed, what they can entail and cost, and what they mean for both industry and counsel.

In January 2022, a Providence, Rhode Island man was arrested by federal agents on suspicion of making false statements to law enforcement and conspiring to export hundreds of privately made firearms to the Dominican Republic. Federal, state, and local investigators allege that Robert Alcantara, 34, was behind a network that assembled “ghost guns” for export to the Dominican Republic. With Export Control Reform moving the jurisdiction of non-military firearms violations to the U.S. Department of Commerce, similar investigations are becoming more common in the export-enforcement realm.

On July 29, 2021, CFIUS published its 2020 Annual Report summarizing CFIUS-covered transaction declarations and notices, outlining mitigation measures and conditions, demonstrating credible evidence of coordinated strategies by foreign actors to acquire critical U.S. technology companies, and reporting on foreign direct investment in the U.S. by countries that boycott Israel or do not ban terrorist organizations.

Safeguarding technical data and preventing unauthorized exports of controlled technical data is a challenge for most companies. As demonstrated by the Honeywell consent agreement, the U.S. Government (“USG”) will not take violations involving unauthorized exports of controlled technical data lightly. Therefore, industry should carefully assess their compliance programs to ensure that technical data is safeguarded properly. This article provides an overview of the Honeywell consent agreement and discusses general recommendations for safeguarding technical data.

On April 27, 2021, Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”) entered into a consent agreement with the U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) for alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). Specifically, Honeywell, a defense contractor based in Charlotte, North Carolina, allegedly exported and retransferred ITAR-controlled technical data without required authorization. 

On March 5, 2021, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") issued a ruling that denied a protest from Dandong Huayang that clothing made at its Chinese factory was not produced by North Korean employees.

On December 14, 2020, the U.S. announced sanctions against the Republic of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), pursuant to Section 231 of CAATSA, for procuring the S-400 surface-to-air missile system from Russia’s Rosoboronexport. SSB is Turkey’s primary defense procurement entity and has responsibilities in defense industrial development.

Earlier this month, e-commerce, retail, and data giant Amazon.com, Inc. ("Amazon") agreed to a settlement with the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") for apparent violations of U.S. sanctions programs.

This article outlines OFAC’s most recent actions.

In 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) entered into six settlement agreements with companies (not including individuals) for export violations of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).

Some of the companies were assessed civil penalties as a result of their violations, while others lost their export privileges.

On September 19, 2019, the U.S. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) entered into a consent agreement with L3Harris Technologies, Inc. (“L3Harris”) for alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). 

What is the appropriate standard for determining whether a defendant has acted willfully in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”)? On August 20, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) weighed in on this question in U.S. v. Burden. 

On August 29, 2018, in a settlement involving Clifford Chance US, LLP, a large international law firm, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) provided the export community with a perfect example of the intersection of, and friction between, immigration anti-discrimination laws and the export control regulations, namely the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) and the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).

The U.S. government maintains a variety of lists of sanctioned or denied parties—including entities, individuals, aircraft, and vessels—with whom companies and individuals are prohibited or restricted from dealing. These lists are assembled for different reasons and under differing authorities. That is, what might get an entity onto a list and how that entity might work to get off the list depends on the authorities and the national security purposes underlying the designation.

On April 24, 2018, FLIR Systems, Inc. (“FLIR”) entered into a consent agreement with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) for alleged violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). FLIR manufactures and exports advanced sensors and integrated sensor systems for various military and commercial platforms used to protect borders, gather intelligence, and protect critical infrastructure. Notably, the consent agreement was reached after FLIR submitted 18 voluntary self-disclosures (“VSD”) between 2008 and 2017.

This article is the second part of a two-part series. In the first article, we introduced the types of company visits conducted by the two major U.S. export agencies,[1] and discussed potential outcomes and consequences of these visits. In this second article, we discuss what to expect during a visit from the agencies and best practices to prepare for them.  The first article can be accessed here.

Aside from a modest rollback regarding the Obama Administration’s effort to allow Americans to travel to Cuba, a number of enforcement cases relating to Iran, some additional designations with respect to Syria, and sanctions-enabling legislation relating to Russia, much of the recent news in economic sanctions has been dominated by two countries: North Korea and Venezuela.

Many exporters are at least vaguely familiar with the “company visits” or “outreach visits” conducted by the export control agencies, but most have very little idea what these visits actually entail, how a company is selected for a visit, or the potential consequences of such a visit. Exporters, freight forwarders, non-exporting manufacturers of defense articles, and companies that share controlled technology with foreign persons, resulting in “deemed exports” should thoroughly prepare for these visits if they are ever “lucky enough” to be selected.

On March 30, President Trump announced his intent to nominate Mira Radielovic Ricardel to the position of Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration.

On March 7, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), and the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) together levied the largest ever export and sanctions related penalty against Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE Corporation (“ZTE”). ZTE agreed to the combined $1.19 billion fine to settle a number of alleged violations of U.S. sanctions targeting Iran.